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A financial strategy is required to ensure that the agreed 1994-98 Medium Term Plans 
can be implemented. To develop such a strategy, the attached paper reviews the strategic 
financial choices facing the CGIAR and explores their implications. Several propositions are 
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Finance Committee agrees with the propositions the Secretariat intends to develop more specific 
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Resource Mobilization in the CGIAR - 
Toward A CGIAR Financial Strategy 
I. The Need for a Financial Strategy 
TAC’s report on “CGIAR Medium-Term Resource allocation 1994-98”) concurrently 
considered by ICW93, translates the CGIAR priorities and strategies endorsed by the Group at 
ICW91 into resource allocation proposals for the centers. Following the recommendations of 
a 1990 review of previous planning efforts, funding constraints have been built into the 
allocation proposals. 
However, the System’s current funding situation raises the question whether the assumptions 
about annual funding levels required to implement TAC’s proposals are realistic. Since the 
initiation of TAC’s present allocation planning process the funding situation has further 
deteriorated and has led to substantial ad hoc cuts in the expenditure of several centers. 
As the CGIAR considers its 1994-98 allocation plans, it is therefore timely to develop a 
financial strategy that will ensure that the agreed medium-term allocation plans can, indeed, be 
implemented. 
This paper reviews the financial choices facing the CGIAR: should it plan its center programs 
on the basis of increasing, constant or declining resource levels. Building on discussions in an 
earlier Secretariat paper presented at MTM93”, the present paper surveys the traditional and 
potential new sources of funding, questions whether the historical funding mix, i.e. the funding 
shares provided by the various donor groups, should be expected to change, and proposes how 
funding sources might be approached. If the Finance Committee agrees with the propositions 
advanced in the present paper, more specific proposals will be developed for approaching the 
various funding sources. 
II. Past Funding of CGIAR Research: The Legacy of Success 
The early years of the CGIAR were marked by a rapid, almost explosive growth in 
membership, in funds provided, and in the number of centers and activities carried out under 
its auspices. “Fund raising in these early years was not difficult. The amounts involved were 
small relative to the aid budgets of most donor countries. The central objective of the Group - 
I/ see Secretariat note of May 24, 1993, on “Trends in CGIAR Funding - Preliminary Observations” 
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to reduce hunger by increasing food production in the developing countries- was universally 
popular ” . *’ The US pledged to provide 25 percent of requirements, and the World Bank agreed 
to meet any shortfall in funding up to 10 percent of total requirements. When the number of 
centers supported by the Group rose to thirteen by 1979, funding was not a problem then. In 
fact, the World Bank, acting as donor of last resort, often did not have to put up its pledged 
maximum contribution of 10 percent of core funding requirements. 
By 1978, all major OECD countries had become members of the CGIAR. After earlier 
increases of 25 to 38 percent, the annual increases had slowed to 10 percent. Thirteen centers 
could no longer be supported on an ad hoc basis. Financial flows had to be stabilized. Time 
had come to introduce financial planning. A five-year plan with financial targets was proposed 
in 1979, anticipating sustained annual real growth at 10 percent. However, while the Group as 
a whole consented, several donors indicated that they would not be able to pledge contributions 
for longer than one-year periods. In the event, funding flows materialized at lower levels and 
in 1992 TAC was asked to adjust center needs to these lower rates of growth. 
Funding had been flat between 1985 and 1991, keeping up with inflation, but without real 
increases. It has declined in real terms since 1992. Furthermore, as a result of adding five new 
centers in 1991/92, the same pie (in real terms) now had to be divided between the larger 
number of centers. In 1993, donor contributions, for the first time, declined also in nominal 
terms. 
III. The “Strategy” of the Past and Today’s Changed Priorities: From Dividing the 
Cake to Finding the Dough 
The CGIAR prides itself on its informal set-up. With no legal status and a minimal corporate 
infrastructure it has nonetheless succeeded for more than two decades to build and sustain the 
largest international research network. 
Its hallmarks have been the freedom of its donors to fund the centers of their choice among 
those supported by the Group and the freedom of the centers to program their research and 
present proposals for donor funding while at the same time agreeing on a common research 
strategy and agenda. While research is long-term, the CGIAR has funded itself on an annual 
basis. 
As long as donor support was generous and steady, the arrangement worked well. Centers 
received funding to carry out their agreed programs. The balancing facility was provided by the 
World Bank, acting as “donor of last resort”. 
21 Baum, “Partners Against Hunger”, Washington, D.C. 1986, p.65 
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As a system, the CGIAR has with only limited success grappled with the phenomenon of a 
resource base which no longer grew in pace with demand. It has been largely left to individual 
centers to scale back their operations. The balancing facility has continued to fill gaps, but less 
and less as those gaps grew larger. Currently, most centers are operating at levels substantially 
below their 1990-91 funding. 
The TAC paper for a “CGIAR Medium-Term Resource Allocation 1994-98”) concurrently 
before the Finance Committee, takes into account the recommendations of the 1990 task force 
report3’ in an attempt to reign in demand. If adopted by the Group, the plan could well form 
the basis for the implementation of the Group’s Strategies and Priorities over the next five-year 
period. 
It would seem that the System has by now exploited and exhausted reasonable possibilities 
of reigning in and controlling demand without fundamental structural changes in its operating 
mode. In order to plan and carry out its mission, it will in future need a more predictable 
supply of funds. 
Iv. Basic Choices 
The funding of the System is a function of what its stake-holder expect from it, and its donors 
want to accomplish with it. Do they want to continue using the System as a major conduit and 
instrument for supporting developing country agriculture and resource management? Or has the 
System accomplished its mission and should be phased down or out? These questions, not 
frequently asked, require an answer as a basis for sustainable longer-term planning. 
A. Three Basic Scenarios 
Donors could chose among three directions in which they want the System to develop: 
contraction, maintenance of current research levels, or expansion. Three simple scenarios can 
be developed and will be quantified to illustrate the ramifications of these choices. They are not 
actual planning figures. 
3’ In 1990, the CGIAR adopted the recommendations of a task force (the McWilliams report) to build in supply 
constraints into centers’ medium-term plans. “Although there is general support for a demand driven approach by 
centers in seeking funds from donors, it is important, as the growth in the supply of donor funds slows, that the 
system presents a request to donors based on a more rigorous analysis of needs and a more responsible appreciation 
of the likely supply of funds. For this reason, TAC’s analysis of activities and programs must in future also 
consider the supply constraint when recommending individual center MTPs for approval by the CGIAR. To achieve 
this, the growth-curve of the CGIAR core programs over time should parallel the predicted growth in the supply 
of funds with a 5% up and down margin for error. ’ 
-4- 
Scenario I (Phasing down or out) 
The CGIAR could be restructured, reducing the number of centers, and -at an accelerated 
pace-devolving its functions to other institutions. Over time it would be phased out!. Two 
assumptions could justify this approach: (a) through their NARS, developing countries are well 
on their way to meeting agricultural research needs; (b) donors will increase their direct support 
to NARS. As a result, some centers should be terminated in the near-term, and programs of 
some or all others be driven down. There would be no new programs under this scenario. If 
the System were to be phased out entirely, this could be accomplished by repeating the 
reductions observed in 1993 when total contributions fell by almost 10% in real terms. 
Scenario II (Maintaining capacity) 
Under this scenario the CGIAR would roughly maintain its current capacity and level of 
activity. Supporting assumptions would be that while research needs increase, so would 
developing country research capacity, aided by direct donor support. As a consequence, there 
would be continued revision of priorities and restructuring within the System according to 
changing needs; center programs would be revised, scaled down, phased out, and new ones 
added. Similarly, some centers may be terminated, or merged with others, but there would be 
no contraction or expansion overall. Resources would remain constant in real terms. 
Scenario III (Preparing for new challenges) 
Under this scenario, projected population growth, food deficits, environmental deterioration 
and poverty, and the need for sustainable forms of agricultural production on a finite production 
base (land, water), would call for a vigorous, internationally sponsored agricultural and resource 
management research effort. For this initiative to succeed, available resources in terms of both 
research skills and genetic material, would have to be better harnessed. This effort would be 
part of an integrated global strategy to conserve and husband the world’s biodiversity (of which 
the CGIAR centers would be one of the prime movers, contributing their genebank operations 
and strategic research base) while alleviating poverty through plentiful food supplies at declining 
prices. 
Table 1 illustrates the broad financial implications of the three scenarios. It involves total 
funding, i.e., does not differentiate between core and non-core funding. Amounts are in current 
US dollars, and percentages reflect annual increases in current terms, based on an inflation rate 
of 4 percent. Scenario III approximates the higher of two annual core funding levels proposed 
by TAC for 1998 at $280 million (in 1992 prices). 
4’ Certain basic functions would probably have to be maintained indefinitely, e.g., crop, forage and livestock 
germplasm collections held in trust for humanity, and the various databanks, information systems and libraries. 
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Table 1 - Funding Scenarios for 1994-98 
II 1984-1988 
1 1989-1993 
II 1994-1998 
Amounts in Current US dollar billions (percentage 
annual increases over preceding five-year period) 
$1.15 b (11%) 
$1.46 b (5%) 
Scenario I Scenario II 
$1.46 b (0%) $1.78 (4%) 
Scenario III 
$2.06 b (6%) 
B. Implications for the Funding Mix 
Under the three scenarios, both donors and centers would face very different challenges. 
Under scenario I, donor contributions could decrease from year to year unless some center 
activities were to be maintained over a longer term. Scenario II would call for continued current 
funding levels, adjusted for inflation. And real increases from all donor groups would be 
required if scenario III were to be realized. 
No particular financial strategy would be called for to implement scenario I: a phase- 
down/phase-out plan should be prepared to implement it. 
By contrast, scenarios II and III would call for a financial strategy which maintains 
contributions from traditional donors and attempts to tap new sources. Under these scenarios, 
OECD countries would be expected to provide stable funding support. The World Bank would 
continue its traditional level of support, i.e., 15 % of core funding. Other institutional donors 
would be invited to increase their contributions. Developing countries would assume larger 
financial responsibility for the System and demonstrate ownership, and support from foundations 
and the private sector would be sought. 
Table 2 attempts to illustrate the resulting funding mix. It shows annualized historical 
contributions by donor groups for the five-year periods 1984-88 and 1989-93, and estimated 
annual contributions for 1994-98 under the three scenarios described above. Amounts are in 
millions of current US dollars; while percentages represent increases/decreases in real terms over 
previous five-year periods. 
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Table 2 - Funding by Donor Groups 
II I 1984-88 I 1989-93 1994-98 scenario I scenario II 1 Scenario III 
Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % 
ODA 155 7.0 206 2.0 206 -4.0 250 0 276 2.0 
donors 
Institutions 33 2.0 38 -2.0 38 4.0 44 0 49 2.0 
World Bank 29 10.0 36 1.0 36 4.0 43 0 48 2.0 
Foundations 6 4.0 8 -1.0 8 -4.0 9 0 11 2.5 
Developing 
Countries 
Other 
Sources 
New 
Sources 
3 -3.0 3 -10.0 3 4.0 5 0 9 50.6 
5 46.0 5 4.0 5 4.0 6 0 8 2.3 
50 
IlTOtd ri31 1 7.0 1 292 1 1.0 1 292 1 4.0 1 355 1 0 1 411 1 2.0 11 
Under all three scenarios, OECD countries would maintain their dominant role as financiers 
of the System, while institutional donors would continue providing roughly their current shares 
under the varying growth assumptions. 
Under scenario II and III, it will be necessary to envisage increased contributions from 
developing countries and foundations (including new foundation donors) and from new sources 
to be tapped in the private sector. 
Developing country contributions should increase from currently annually $2.2 million to $10 
million annually over the five-year period 1994-98. This level would not appear to be 
unrealistic, since the current CGIAR membership includes only eight developing country donors. 
A modest increase should be projected in the level of contributions currently provided by the 
two foundations. This together with contributions from other foundations in the U. S . and abroad 
which should be elicited, would raise total contributions from foundations to $10 million 
annually. 
Other private sector sources would have to be identified and tapped. In the absence of an 
analysis of the funding potential of this source, estimates of possible private sector contributions, 
by necessity, are extremely speculative. As a planning number, an annual average of $10 
million for 1994-98 would seem appropriate. 
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V. Funding Sources and Their Potential 
A. ODA donors 
OECD members have traditionally contributed around 70% of total funding requirements. 
Most of these contributions (about 80%) come out of aid budgets earmarked for multilateral 
programs and institutions. The balance comes out of sector or country aid allocations (“bilateral 
funds”). It is worth noting that CGIAR funding from these bilateral sources suffered less from 
recent cutbacks than multilateral funding; in fact, most of the growth in CGIAR support from 
ODA sources between 1988 and 1993 came from bilateral funds. 
With the exception of Switzerland which in 1991 allocated 1.87% of its aid budget to center 
programs, CGIAR contributions of OECD countries account for less than 1% of their aid 
budgets. By comparison, contributions to IDA amount to about 8 - 9% of aid budgets of the 
same countries I 
II Comparative Aid Indicators Donws Total 1991 CGIAR Grants In Relation to ODA and GDP 
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Aid funding has become more stringent since the mid-eighties, and with a notable time-lag 
of roughly five years this has affected contributions from OECD countries to the CGIAB. 
Efforts in individual countries to curtail public expenditures in response to the global recession 
appear to have had a disproportionate impact on CGIAR contributions. However, given the 
small share of aid allocations claimed by the CGIAR, and the extremely high priority attached 
to its research by Group members, one should not necessarily assume that CGIAR allocations 
will continue to be cut in the same proportion as larger aid programs. In fact, increased 
research funding for agriculture through the CGIAR might in some cases be seen as a legitimate 
way of compensating for reductions necessary in other agricultural development prognu&. 
In assessing the funding potential of this donor group, one should also not overlook the 
considerable interest OECD countries may have in the continued existence of the CGIAR: many 
are important agricultural producers, have benefitted, and still stand to benefit substantially from 
windfall gains of CGIAR research. 
To conclude, because amounts of OECD donor contributions when expressed in relation to 
GDP are small and represent a minute fraction of total aid allocations, even in times of severe 
budget constraints one should not anticipate absolute supply constraints. 
B. Institutional Donors 
This group which comprises the World Bank, the UNDP, FAO, the regional development 
banks (ADB, AfDB and IDB), the Kuwait Fund, the Arab Fund for Social and Economic 
development, in some years the Saudi Fund, and the EC has traditionally provided between 25 
and 30% of total resource requirements. 
Past funding performance of these institutional donors has varied greatly. Some institutions 
have provided excellent support while others have contributed well below their possibilities, and 
still others to date have not been invited into the CGIAB such as the EBBD and the EIB. Some 
institutions are reluctant to make grant money directly available to CGIAR centers and instead 
propose to provide funds to client countries could be used to support research activities at the 
centers. The effectiveness of this approach is still to be tested. 
Also for institutional donors, one should not assume the existence of binding internal 
constraints on the amounts that an institution can contribute to the CGIAR. When compared to 
their overall support to developing country agriculture, be this in the form of loans or technical 
assistance, amounts subscribed to the CGIAR are small. 
5’ Because agriculture is a prime factor in managing the environment, more eibironmental spending might 
translate into a renewed emphasis on funding research for agriculture, forestry, fisheries and related resource 
management. 
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C. Developing country donors 
A consequence of the fact that CGIAR funding is coming mainly from aid budgets of OECD 
countries is the notion that the CGIAR is still widely seen among developing countries as a 
unilateral intervention of the North rather than a cooperative venture between North and South. 
The latter’s ownership of the System still appears small. This is borne out by their very nominal 
financial contribution of $2.2 million to the core budget which amounts to less than 1% of total 
core requirements. Obviously, this bears no relation to the enormous benefits, which especially 
major agricultural producers among developing countries have to date derived from CGIAR 
research. 
The case for higher contributions from developing countries can be made on several grounds: 
(a) their own efforts at building an indigenous research capacity need to be supplemented by the 
international centers providing strategic research access and exchange of germplasm and research 
experience worldwide; (b) considering the very high priority of agricultural research and its high 
returns to agricultural producers, contributions to the CGIAR represent rewarding investments 
for these countries; (c) since their contributions would still remain small in relation to per-capita 
income (the fairest and most reasonable benchmark), the often heard argument of a lacking 
capacity to pay cannot be sustained. 
D. Foundations 
When the CGIAR was established, the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations which had 
shouldered the investment and running expenses of four pre-CGIAR almost alone, each set a 
ceiling of $3 million for their annual contributions to the CGIAR. They currently contribute 
US$4 million, or less than US$2 million in 1972 dollars, i.e., well below their self-imposed 
ceiling. Thus, there would seem to be a case for increasing their contributions, possibly through 
provision of more project funds. 
Except for the Kellogg and Leverhulme Foundations, no other foundations have financially 
supported the CGIAR. There would seem to be potential for inviting other foundations in the 
U.S. and abroad into the CGIAR, which must be explored. 
E. Private sector 
Except for the foundations, the private sector has not yet contributed to the CGIAR. For 
several reasons, it should. Agro-based industries in the developed countries benefit substantially 
from CGIAR research through which they gain access to research products and germplasm, and 
indirectly by benefiting from rapidly expanding developing country markets for agro-industry 
products and services. 
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A private sector potential could be tapped through (a) philanthropic fund-raising campaigns 
in key industrial countries; (b) corporate donations; and (c) possibly by combining the two, the 
establishment of an endowment fund. 
F. Fund raising approaches 
To ensure availability of the resources to maintain current levels of activities or allow for 
some growth would require stronger and longer-term commitments, at least from the System’s 
major donors. While there should be no attempt to tinker with the three key principles of 
collective agenda setting, donor autonomy in allocating their funds, and center freedom in 
designing their programs, there should be more than a moral commitment to supporting the 
System over the long haul. 
Within these parameters, several possibilities to enhance the level of financial commitment 
come to mind. They would maintain the self-assessment rule while giving recognition to donors 
for the level and volume of their support: 
First, there could be periodic reviews of donor performance within peer groups (ODA 
countries, developing countries, institutional donors) which would establish pledging targets for 
each donor, e.g., in relation to a donor’s per capita GDP (for countries) and total annual lending 
(for development institutions). 
Second, donor privileges and responsibilities would be commensurate with levels of 
contribution. Only “senior” donors could be part of donor committees (e.g. finance and 
oversight committees) and participate in executive sessions at donor meetings, A donor who 
exceeded the above established indicated pledging target would be considered “senior”, and thus 
eligible. 
Third, multi-annual contributions from OECD donors could be negotiated. This would follow 
the example of IDA replenishment negotiations, and would carry a legal commitment to fund 
centers over a period of time. Donors would be expected to undertake such pluri-annual 
commitments for, say, three or five year@‘. Ideally, such funding commitments should 
correspond to the period covered by five-year allocation plans. It would seem important to have 
donor commitments cover at least 90 % of such plans. The balance could be made up from new 
sources. 
6’ Multi-annual commitments would, in many countries, require parliamentary approval. While seemingly 
complicating the donor’s role, parliamentary action could turn out to be beneficial for the level of CGIAR awareness 
among political and decision-making constituencies in the country, thus helping to facilitate donor work. 
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Fourth, the establishment of a high level advisory panel of eminent, independent personalities 
(the “Blue Ribbon” Committee proposed by many observers) would enhance visibility of, and 
provide a boost to, the CGIAR’s fund-raising drives in regard to all donor groups. 
VI. Recommendations 
The Finance Committee may want to decide 
on the broad parameters of a future funding strategy for the CGIAR: that such strategy 
aim at scaling down or phasing out the System, maintaining its current level of activities, 
or increasing it in real terms; 
that in keeping with the parameters so decided, a CGIAR financing plan be drawn up that 
would indicate pledging targets for individual donors, supplemented by a special “fund- 
raising” campaign for the contribution by private sector; requesting the Secretariat to 
develop detailed strategies for mobilizing resources from each donor group; 
that the formation of a high-level advisory panel (Blue Ribbon Panel) be pursued 
vigorously to support fund-raising efforts vis-a-vis traditional and new donors. 
CGIAR Secretariat 
